VPNs were designed for a world where the network perimeter defined the security boundary. That world ended years ago, but VPN infrastructure remains entrenched in most enterprise environments. The problem is not just that VPNs are outdated. They are actively targeted. Credential harvesting through VPN endpoints, lateral movement once inside the tunnel, and broad network access granted to any authenticated user make VPNs a persistent and well-understood attack surface. Critical VPN vulnerabilities have made headlines repeatedly, and attackers know that a compromised VPN credential often provides unrestricted access to internal resources.

The alternative is not theoretical. Identity-aware access models enforce adaptive authentication, just-in-time access, continuous session monitoring, and granular resource-level controls that eliminate the "inside the tunnel means inside the network" assumption. Addressing the transition requires coordination across ZTNA, SASE, IAM, and privileged access controls to replace broad network access with application-level, identity-verified connectivity. Organizations that have made the shift report reduced attack surface, improved visibility into access patterns, and the ability to enforce least privilege at a level VPNs were never designed to support.

Topics include:

• Why VPN infrastructure remains a high-value target and how attackers exploit it
• Implementing identity-aware, application-level access across ZTNA, SASE, and IAM platforms
• Managing the operational transition from VPN to zero trust access without disrupting users

Explore how organizations are replacing their VPN infrastructure with identity-centric access models that reduce risk, improve visibility, and align with zero trust principles.